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ARE TAX "BENEFITS" FOR RELIGIOUS 
INSTITUTIONS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
DEPENDENT ON BENEFITS FOR 
SECUI.AR ENTITIES? 
EDWARD A ZELINSKY* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court generally conditions tax exemptions, 
deductions, and exclusions for religious organizations and activities 
upon the simultaneous extension of such benefits to secular institutions 
and undertakings. The Court's position flows logically from its 
ac,:eptance of the premise that tax exemptions, deductions, and 
exdusions constitute subsidies. However, the "subsidy" label is usually 
deployed in a conclusory and unconvincing fashion . The First 
Amendment is best understood as permitting governments to refrain 
from taxation to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and 
activities; hence, tax benefits extended solely to religious institutions 
should pass constitutional muster as recognition of that autonomy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Does it matter constitutionally whether tax exemptions, exclu-
siom, and deductions for religious institutions and activities are 
mate hed by comparable exemptions, exclusions, and deductions for 
secular entities? The U.S. Supreme Court has, on several occasions, 
answered this question affirmatively. For example, in Texas Monthly v. 
Bullock, the Court struck a sales tax exemption for religious periodi-
cals, principally on the ground that the exemption was limited to sec-
tarian publications.1 
The plurality opinion in Texas Monthly relied, inter alia, upon the 
Coul't's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission.2 In Walz, the Court had 
sustained New York's exemption of 1-eligious properties from real 
property taxation, characterizing that exemption as part of a larger 
policy that excluded from taxation "a broad class of property owned 
* Professor of law at the Be njamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva Unive1·sity. He 
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor E\'e lyn Brody and, as usual, Doris Zelin-
sky. 
1 189 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). 
2 5ee id. al 11 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, :~97 U.S. 664 (1970) ) . 
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by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations. "3 The Walz Court upheld 
New York's tax-exemption of religious properties on several grounds, 
one of which was the simultaneous exemption of other types of prop-
erties owned by secular groups in the nonprofit sector.4 
This Article explores the extent to which the constitutionality of 
tax benefits5 for religious institutions depend upon the simultan~ous 
extension of such benefits to secular organizations. The issue is a 
hardy perennial6 and of topical concern: while the final form and im-
pact of President Bush's faith-based charitable initiative is to yet be 
determined, an expansion of tax benefits is a likely component of this 
initiative.7 The issue thus arises whether, as a constitutional matter,8 
such benefits must extend to all charitable organizations and acth-ities 
or whether expanded charitable deductions could, consistent with the 
First Amendment, be limited to religious entities and undertakings. 
In Sectiori I of this Article, I consider the three rationales for 
providing tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions: ( 1) that such 
exemptions, deductions, and exclusions subsidize, (2) that they 
define the base for taxation, and (3) that they minimize entangle-
ment between government and religious institutions. 
3 Walz. 397 U.S. at 664,673. 
4 It was panicularly important to Justices Brennan and Hadan in the ir separntt- con-
curring opinions that New York exempted not just religious propenies, but also th•~ real 
estate owned by a broad army of nonprofit entities. As we shall see i1tfra, the concerns of 
these connuTingjustices ha\'e become central to the Court's current doctrine in this 1rea. 
5 I use the tenn "tax benefits" advisedly since many tax provisions commonly denoted 
as "benefits" arguably define the tax base, rnther than subsidize, and the term "be11efits" 
canies the possible connotation that these tax provisions constitute subsidies. See infra Part 
I; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax 'Be1tefits' Constitutional~y Equivalent lo Direct E.,pendi-
tures?, 112 HARVARD LAW REv. 379, 394-95 (1998). In deference to con\'ention, I w.e the 
term "tax benefi ts" in this Article but I do not intend the term to indicate that these provi-
sions are properly characterized as tax subsidies or expenditures. 
6 For example, as I write this Article, the Pennsylvania Legislature is considering a sales 
tax exemption for all publications, the Pennsylvania Sup1·eme Court having strick,:n an 
exemption limited to 1·eligious publications. See Ken Dilanian , Pennsylvania La111111ake·, Pro-
pose Exemption For All Books, STATE TAX NOTES, Mar. 20, 2001, at 54-28. 
7 See Fred Stokeld, Bush Budget Plan ·would Promote Chmitabfe Giving, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Mai·. 22, 2001, at 69-2; see also Brant Goldwyn, Faith-Based Bills Would Offer Tax Breaks For 
Cha1itable Giving, Seif-Help Accounts, DAILY TAX REPORT, Mar. 22, 2001; Patti Mohr, Biparti-
san Faith-Based Bills llld1ule Incentives For Charitable Giving, TAX NOTES TODAY, Ap1·. 10, 2001, 
al 56-3. On the President 's faith-based initiative m01·e genernlly, see Donald F. Kettl . Hav-
ingFaith in Faith. 14 GovERNING No. 7, 12 (Apr. 2001). 
8 Of course, tax benefits focused exclnsh-ely upon 1·eligious act01·s might be co11stit11-
tional but less desirable as a matter of policy than benefi ts extending to seculai· institutions 
as well. My focus in this Article is limited to the constit11tional considerations. 
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Section II reviews the Supreme Court case law exploring the con-
stitutionality of tax benefits for religious entities and discusses these 
cases in the context of the three rationales outlined in Section I. In 
addition to Walz and Texas Monthly, these cases include Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania,9 Follett v. Town of McCormick, 10 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. 
Board of Equalization, 11 and Mueller v. Allen.12 
The final section summarizes my conclusions: As a matter of posi-
tive law, the question whether tax benefits for religious institutions 
depend constitutionally on benefits for secular entities must be an-
swered with a qualified "yes." In its present form, the Supreme Court's 
case law generally conditions tax exemptions, deductions, and exclu-
sions for religious organizations and activities upon the simultaneous 
extension of such benefits to secular institutions and undertakings. 
The Court's position flows logically from its acceptance of the premise 
that these tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions constitute sub-
sidies. 
However, as a normative matter, my conclusion is to the contrary. 
In the context of tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions, the 
"subsidy" label is usually deployed in a conclusory and unconvincing 
fashion. In this setting, the First Amendment is best understood as 
permitting governments to refrain from taxation to accommodate the 
auto,1omy of religious actors and activities; hence, tax benefits ex-
tended solely to religious institutions should pass constitutional mus-
ter as recognition of that autonomy. Since it is most convincing to 
think of religious tax exemption as the acknowledgment of sectarian 
sovereignty (rather than the subsidization of religion), there is no 
compelling constitutional reason to link that exemption to the simul-
taneous extension of comparable tax benefits to secular entities and 
undertakings. 
[n final analysis, tax exemption does not subsidize churches, but 
leaves them alone. 
9 )il9 U.S. l05 (1943) . 
10 321 U.S. 573 (1944) . 
11 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
12 463 U.S. 388 (1983) . 
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I. THE THREE RATIONALES FORT AX BENEFITS 
Perhaps the most common characterization of tax exemptions, 
exclusions, and deductions is that they subsidize.13 From this penpec-
tive, the tax benefits extended to religious institutions and acthities 
constitute a subsidy from the public fisc. 
Likely the most famous statement of this perspective 1s Ulvsses 
Grant's warning that religious property, 
receiving all the protection and benefits of Government 
without bearing its proportion of the burdens and expenses 
of the same, will not be looked upon acquiescently by those 
who have to pay the taxes. In a growing country, where real 
estate enhances so rapidly with time, as in the United States, 
there is scarcely a limit to the wealth that may be acquired by 
corporations, religious or otherwise , if allowed to retain real 
estate without taxation. The contemplation of so vast a 
property as here alluded to, without taxation, may lead to 
sequestration, without constitutional authority and through 
blood.14 
From a variety of vantages, Grant's observations are curious. The 
exemptions to which he was objecting were exemptions from local 
and state property taxes, a surprising subject of presidential attemion. 
Arguably, Grant's statement articulated a nativist subtext, a warning 
against the growing power and property ownership of the Catholic 
church.15 
Despite its questionable provenance, Grant's statement n ·pre-
sents a classic articulation of the notion that tax exemptions for 
13 See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. Rn . 971, 
993 (1999) ('The word 'subsidy' has crept into our day-to-day characterization of tax ex-
emptions."). 
14 Grant made these observations in his 1875 State of the Union Message. See Wah, 397 
U.S. at 71 5 n .17 (D011glas,J., dissenting); see also JEAN EDWARD SMITH, GRANT 570 (~'.001). 
Grant's observations are widely quoted by those opposing tax exemptions for church,~s. See 
Rev. L. M. Birkhead, A Preacher Advocates Church Taxation, at http:/ / www.infidels.org/ lib-
rary / histo1·ical/rev _l_m_bit·khead / dmrch_taxation.hunl (Apr. 7, 2001). 
15 Grant was certainly not immune from sentiments of this sort, having issued tlw anti--
Semitic General Orders No.11 during the height of the Civil War. See GEOFFREY PERRET, 
ULYSSES S. GRANT 237-38 (1997); BROOKS D. SIMPSON, ULYSSES S. GRANT 163-65 (~'.000); 
SMITH, supra note 14, at 225-27, 459-60. Moreove1·, others writing at the same time as 
Grant's statement explicitly linked the issue of tax exemption with the grnwing poHer of 
the Catholic Church. See Stephen Diamond, Efficiency and Benevolence: Philanthrop.'c Tax 
Exemptions in Nineteen th Century America, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: 
MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed., forthcoming 2001). 
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churches constitute a public subsidy of religion, which enables relig-
ious institutions to acquire real estate they otherwise could not afford. 
In a similar vein (but, of course, without any of Grant's subtext), 
my colleague Professor Marci A. Hamilton has recently written that 
" [ t] he entrenchment of property tax exemption has created a power-
ful financial incentive for religious institutions to expand their range 
of activities. "16 
Among contemporary tax policy theorists, the subsidy approach 
is today usually articulated in the vocabulary of tax expenditure analy-
sis.17 The central premise of this analysis is that tax provisions fall into 
two categories, normative provisions, which properly define the base 
of the tax, and expenditure provisions, which deviate from the nor-
mative tax base in a fashion economically equivalent to direct gov-
ernment expenditures.18 There is nothing in this framework which 
necessarily requires an expansive or restrictive approach to labeling 
particular deductions, exclusions, or exemptions as either normative 
or expenditure provisions. In practice, however, tax expenditure stal-
warts have applied tl1e expenditure label broadly, leading them to 
characterize many well-known tax provisions as expenditure-type sub-
sidies from the public treasury. 
Thus, Professors Surrey and McDaniel declare the federal in-
come tax exemption of nonprofit institutions19 an expenditure, rather 
than a normative, tax provision.20 They similarly characterize the fed-
eral income tax's charitable deduction21 as a tax expenditure.22 The 
federal tax expenditure budgets reflect this view that the charitable 
deduction constitutes a tax expenditure.23 
16 Ma1·ci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823, 861 (2001). 
17 See King, supra note 13, at 994 ("The source of the tendency now to characterize an 
'exemption • as a 'subsidy' is tax expenditure analysis."). 
18 For more extensive discussion of tax expenditure analysis, see Edward A. Zelinsky, 
James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Prncedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and 
Tax hstitutions, 102 YALE L.J. ll65, ll68-71 ( 1993). 
19 Seel.RC. § 501 (1994) . 
20 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 219 (1985) ("(T]he 
U.S. tax u·eatment of non prnfit organizations should be classified as a tax expenditure."). 
21 See I.RC.§ l 70 (l 994). 
22 SURREY & McDANIEL, sujJra note 20, at 170 ("the code's charitable contribution tax 
expenditure"). 
23 See, e.g. , Office of Management and Budget, "Budget Analytical Perspectives, Chapter 5-Tax 
Expentitures," TAX Norns TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000, at 40-36 item 82 (listing as a tax expendi-
ture the deductibility of contributions for education) , item 92 (listing as a tax expenditure 
the deductibility of all charitable contributions other than those for education and 
healtli) , item 101 (listing as a tax expenditure the d eductibility of contl"ibutions fo1· 
health) . 
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From the tax expenditure perspective, tax provisions which ex-
empt religious entities from taxation or which provide deduction,; for 
contributions to such entities are simply public subsidies of religion, 
equivalent to direct outlays. Thus, Professors Surrey and McDaniel, in 
their analysis of Walz v. Tax Commission and the property tax exemp-
tion for churches, indicate that only Justice Douglas understood the 
case correctly: the exemption of churches and synagogues from real 
property taxation is unconstitutional as an expenditure-type subsidy 
of religion.24 
An alternative understanding of deductions, exclusions, and ex-
emptions is that they define the base of the relevant tax, rather than 
subsidize. The best known academic proponent of this view is Profes-
sor Bittker, the leading critic of tax expenditure analysis. It is mean-
ingless, Professor Bittker argues, to label a particular provision as a 
deviation from a normative tax system unless and until there is 
agreement on the contours of that system, agreement which is often 
elusive and illusory.25 
From this perspective, Professor Bittker contends, it is plausible 
to characterize the base of the New York real property tax as "personal 
residences and business property."26 Hence, there is no "exemption" 
or "subsidy" for religious or charitable properties since excluding 
these properties from taxation "is simply a natural outgrowth of the 
unavoidable process of defining the appropriate tax base. "27 
Similarly, Professor Andrews defends the charitable deduction as 
base-defining.28 According to Professor Andrews, one of the two com-
ponents of the income tax base is "private, preclusive household con-
sumption. "29 Resources given to charity are not privately consumed in 
a fashion which precludes others but are, instead, devoted to public 
purposes.30 Hence, a deduction for such resources is not a subsidy, but 
a necessary step in measuring the taxpayer's income, a step which 
24 SURREY & McDANIEL, mpm note 20, at 133 ("More to the point was Justice D0t1glas's 
question in disse nt. ") . 
25 Boris I. Binker, Accom1tingfor Federal 'Tax Subsidies' in the National Budget, 22 :'1AT 0 L 
TAxJ. 244 (1969) . 
26 Bods I. Biuke r, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L. J. 1285, 1291 ( l 9b9). 
2, Id. 
28 William D. Andrews, Personal Dedu ctions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309 
(1972). 
29 Id. at 371. The other compone nt of the income tax base is savings. This formulation 
reflects the we ll-known Haig-Simo ns definition o f income as the sum of savings and con-
sumption. 
30 Id. at 344. 
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recognizes that the taxpayer has not privately consumed these do-
nated resources and thus has no income from them. 31 
On numerous occasions, the courts, while not using contempo-
rary nomenclature about tax base definition, have in substance articu-
lated the same notion.32 For example, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, in an 1899 decision about Yale's tax-exempt status, character-
ized that status in terms remarkably similar to Professor Bittker's: 
The non-taxation of public buildings is not the exception 
but the rule. The corporations, whether municipal or pri-
vate, which own and are by law charged with the mainte-
nance of such untaxed buildings, are not the recipients of 
special privileges, in any sense obnoxious to the law. The 
seats of government, State or municipal, highways, parks, 
churches, public school-houses, colleges, have never been 
within the range of taxation; they cannot be exceptions from 
a rule in which they were never included. 33 
Yet a third defense of exemptions, exclusions, and deductions for 
religious institutions travels under such labels as "entanglement" and 
"accommodation." From this perspective, churches and other relig-
ious institutions are removed from taxation to minimize conflict with 
government. If, 011 the other hand, religious properties are taxed, the 
inevitable result is discord between religious institutions and govern-
ment. 
Professor Brody formulates this notion through the evocative 
term "sovereignty perspective,"34 a term which captures the autonomy 
considerations underlying entanglement concerns in their strongest 
form: "For all its imprecision, tax exemption keeps government out of 
the charities' day-to-day business, and keeps charities out of the busi-
ness of petitioning government for subvention. "35 
31 Professor Andrews also defines the deduction for medical expenses as base-<lefining. 
Professor Andrews' analysis is logically extended to the deduction for state and local taxes. 
See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Inco111e Measurement. Tax 
Expeniitures and Partial, FunctionalDedul'libility, 6 AM.J. OF TAX PoL'Y 9, 31-32 (1987). 
32 See infra notes 53-79, 144-58 and accompanying text. 
33 Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 42 A. 87, 91 (1899). 
3
~ Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conce/1tualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 
lowAJ. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998) [hereinafter So11ereignty and Subsidy]; see also Evelyn Brody, 
Legal Themies of Tax Exemption: So11ereig11ty Quasi and Real, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR 
CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed., forthcoming 2001). 
35 Sovereignty and Subsidy, supra note 34, at 586. 
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The entanglement/ accommodation approach squarely places 
exclusions, exemptions, and deductions for religious entities and ac-
tivities in the American tradition of separating church and state. As 
Professor Jaffa has recently observed, with the emergence of Christi-
anity, 
the political history of Western man for the next millennium 
and a half was dominated, especially in the High Middle 
Ages, by the contest for preeminence between emperors and 
popes, the two ultimate forms of rule in the post-classical 
world .... [T] he solution to the problem of that relationship 
of emperor and pope, or of Caesar and Christ, was only dis-
covered in the American Revolution and the American 
Founding, in the separation of church and state.36 
A key portion of that solution has been the financing of the state 
through taxes which respect the autonomy of religious institutions 
and activities. 
As we shall see,37 entanglement/ accommodation doctrine in the 
tax context comes in three different forms. In its weakest version, 
concern about entanglement is concern about secular authorities and 
religious groups fighting over the boundaries of tax exemption. In 
this incarnation, entanglement theory indicts tax benefits restricted 
to religious institutions as engendering borderline conflicts and 
justifies the denial of tax benefits to religious actors and activities to 
eliminate such borderlines. 
In a stronger version of the doctrine, exemplified by Chief Jmtice 
Burger's Walz opinion, respect for the autonomy of sectarian persons 
permits the state to refrain from taxing them. This form of permissive 
accommodation justifies tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions 
which cover only religious institutions. 
In its strongest form, entanglement considerations inform a read-
ing of the First Amendment as compelling tax exemptions for relig-
ious persons. The critical normative issue in this area is which of these 
three versions of entanglement doctrine is ultimately to control the 
interpretation of the First Amendment. 
36 HARRY V.jAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 140 (2000). 
37 See infm Pan II. 
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II. THE CASES 
This section reviews the Supreme Court's cases exploring the 
constitutionality of tax benefits for religious entities. As we shall see, 
those cases, starting with Murdock v. Pennsylvania38 and Follett v. Town of 
McCormick,39 have frequently split the Court. In its current state, the 
Court's First Amendment doctrine conditions tax benefits for relig-
ious institutions on the concurrent extension of such benefits to secu-
lar entities. This position ultimately rests on the characterization of 
tax exemptions, exclusions, and deductions as subsidies, a characteri-
zation which, when probed, proves unpersuasive. 
For purposes of the present discussion, the most interesting fea-
tures of Murdock and Follett are that, in those cases, the tax exemption 
for religious activity was created by the Court itself, based on its un-
derstanding of the imperatives of the First Amendment, and that this 
judicially-created exemption is exclusively for religious activity. 
Murdock and Follett were both decided 5-4 and both involved mu-
nicipal ordinances imposing flat licensing fees on persons selling 
goods and merchandise in the community.40 As the dissenters pointed 
out, the challenged fees applied to all such persons and were not 
proved excessive in amount.41 Nevertheless, the Murdock Court held, 
in au opinion by Justice Douglas, that the First Amendment required 
exemption for Jehovah's Witnesses' canvassing activities.42 
Although the majority did not use the term "entanglement," it 
reasoned in those terms. The fees imposed by the challenged ordi-
38319U.S.105 (1943). 
39 321 U.S. 573 (1944) . 
40 The license fee in Murdock was $1.50 for one day, $7.00 for one week, $12.00 for two 
weeks, and $20.00 for three weeks. See 319 U.S. at 106. The license fee in Follett was $1.00 
per <lay or $1 5.00 per year. See 321 U.S. al 574. The fees we1·e thus mu-elated lo the amount 
of sales made by the licensed canvasser. See Fol/ell, 321 U.S. at 574: Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106. 
The flat nature of the fees assessed in Murdock and Follett became particularly critical in 
subse,1uen1 consideration of these cases. See inji-a notes I 02-108 and accompanying text. 
41 See Murdoch, 319 U.S. at 118 (Reed,]. , dissenting) (uNo evidence is offe red 10 show 
the amount is oppressh·e .. .. The1·e is no contention in any of these cases 1ha1 such dis-
crimination is pi-act iced in !he application of the ordinances."). 
42 Id. at 105, 111-12. The Coun did not come to this conclusion easily. The Coun ini-
1ially 11pheld these kinds of fees as applied to J e hovah 's Witnesses and then reversed itse lf. 
Co111/J//re Follell, 321 U.S. at 573, and Mwdoch, 319 U.S. at 105, wilhJones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 
584,597 (1942) ("When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary com-
mercial methods of sales of articles to rnise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper 
exercise of the power of the State to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of canvass-
ing."). Oj1elika was authored by Justice Reed who dissented in Murdoch and concurred in 
Fol/ell only because, at that point , he viewed Murdock as controlling precedent. See Fol/ell, 
321 U.S. at 578. 
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nances imposed unacceptably intrusive burdens on the exercise of 
religious rights, i.e., the Jehovah's Witnesses' canvassing. It does not 
matter, for First Amendment purposes, that comparable burdem are 
imposed on commercial activity: "The constitutional rights of those 
spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word 
are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers 
of books. "43 
While "religious groups and the press" can be taxed to defray the 
costs of government, the flat license fees imposed constitutionally un-
acceptable burdens directly on the exercise of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses' First Arnendment rights: "It is one thing to impose a tm~ on 
the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to ex-
act a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. "44 
The Murdock minority would have none of this. The ordinances, 
they contended, imposed "nondiscriminatory, nonexcessive taxa-
tion. "45 The Murdock majority thus created "a tax subsidy" by holding 
the Jehovah's Witnesses immune from the fees imposed by municipal 
ordinance. 46 
A year later, Follett confirmed the Court's division. The narrow 
majority concluded again that the First Amendment requires exemp-
tion from a municipality's flat license fee for Jehovah's Witnesse5' re-
ligious solicitors. The majority further denied that this conclusion 
"mean[s] that religious undertakings must be subsidized" or that re-
ligious groups and actors cannot be subject to taxation: "But to say 
that they, like other citizens, may be subject to general taxation does 
not mean that they can be required to pay a tax for the exerci~e of 
that which the First Amendment has made a high constitutional privi-
lege. "47 
Concurring with Justice Douglas's opinion for the Follett Court, 
Justice Murphy took particular aim at the minority's claim "that the 
effect of our decision is to subsidize religion: "48 "[T] his is merely a 
harsh way of saying that to prohibit the taxation of religious acthities 
is to give substance to the constitutional right of religious freedom. "49 
43 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111. 
44 Id. at 112. 
45 Id. at 121 (Reed,J., dissenting). 
46 Id. at 130 (Reed,J., dissenting) . 
47 Follett, 321 U.S. at 577-78. 
48 Id. at 578-79 (Murphy,J., conc11ning). 
49 Id. at 579 (Murphy,J., concmring) . 
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The minority remained unconvinced. The challenged license fee 
was neither "discriminatory" nor "onerous. "50 As a result of the major-
ity's decision exempting him from the municipal license fee, Mr. "Fol-
lett will enjoy a subsidy for his religion. "51 
.Justice Murphy's observations presaged those of Professor Bittker 
a generation later and highlight the problematic nature of the tax 
subsidy label. It is only compelling to declare a tax exemption a sub-
sidy after one has established the nonnative tax base from which such 
exemption is a departure. There is no subsidy if the activity excluded 
from taxation should not have been taxed in the first place. However, 
the Murdock/ Follett minority never specifies the normative tax from 
which exemption for religious solicitors constitutes a subsidizing de-
viation. 
The implicit premise of the minority's position is that the mu-
nicipal ordinances in question establish normative taxes so that any 
deviation from the mandate of those ordinances constitutes a subsidy. 
But this unstated premise confronts, without answering, the entan-
glement concerns of the majority: if the ordinances unacceptably in-
trude upon the exercise of First Amendment rights by directly bur-
dening religious solicitation, those ordinances cannot constitutionally 
establish a baseline from which deviations can be deemed subsidizing. 
By definition, an unconstitutional tax cannot serve as a normative 
baseline. 
In short, the Murdock/ Follett minority reasons circularly when it 
characterizes the judicially-created exemption for religious canvassers 
as a "subsidy." If one starts with the premise that the challenged mu-
nicipal ordinances are a nonnative standard, it indeed creates an ex-
penditure-type subsidy to exempt from their coverage religious solici-
tors. However, the premise that the ordinances can constitutionally 
serve as a normative baseline assumes away the majority's concern, 
i.e., that, as a First Amendment matter, entanglement considerations 
in the first instance preclude the application of these ordinances and 
their fees to religious solicitors. If entanglement concerns do forbid 
localities from assessing license fees from sectarian canvassers, tax 
statutes imposing such fees violate the First Amendment and, hence, 
cannot constitutionally serve as a baseline for measuring subsidiza-
tion . 
50 ld. at 579-80 (Murphy, J., concmring). 
51 Id. at 581 (M111·phy,J., conn11Ti11g). 
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The opinions of the Murdock/ Follett minority further suggest why 
the Court's subsequent case law often focuses upon the simultaneous 
extension vel non of tax benefits to secular as well as religious institu-
tions. If exemptions, exclusions, or deductions do constitute subsi-
dies, subsidies restricted to religious entities and activities raise trou-
bling Establishment Clause issues. Indeed, a subsidy underwriting 
only religious activity would appear to be the classic target at which 
the Establishment Clause is aimed. If, on the other hand, such tax 
provisions are characterized as subsidies but extend to broad catego-
ries of nonprofit institutions, it is arguably not religion as such being 
subsidized, but eleemosynary activity more generally. 
While Murdock and Follett divided the Court, Walz v. Tax Cwimis-
sion, upholding New York's tax exemption for religious properties, 
was an 8-1 decision.52 However, the Court's near-unanimity as to re-
sult did not reflect near-unanimity as to reasoning as two of the eight 
justices who sustained the New York exemption did so on grounds 
quite different from those of their colleagues. Indeed, the Court's 
subsequent decisions made these concurrences, not the Walz majority 
opinion, the controlling statement of the Court's jurisprudence in 
this area.53 
Writing for six members of the Walz majority, Chief Justice Bur-
ger sustained New York's real property tax exemption for religious 
institutions in entanglement/accommodation terms. The goal of the 
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, Chief Justice Burger wrote, 
is to find a path between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
"to avoid excessive entanglement" of government and religious insti-
tutions,54 thereby "prevent[ing] the kind of involvement that would 
tip the balance toward government control of churches or goYern-
ment restraint on religious practice. "55 
Given a constitutionally-based concern with "the autonomy and 
freedom of religious bodies,''56 it is plausible for New York and other 
states to determine that such bodies "should not be inhibited in their 
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties 
for nonpayment of taxes. "57 
52 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970) . 
53 See infra notes 91-159 and accompanying text. 
5
~ 397 U.S. at 669-70. 
55 Jd. 
56 Id. at 672. 
57 Id. 
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Grants of exemption historically reflect the concern of 
authors of constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers 
inherent in the imposition of property taxes; exemption 
constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard 
against those dangers .... 58 
Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the in-
volvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of 
church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct 
confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those 
legal processes .... 59 
The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly 
less in their potential than the hazards of government sup-
porting churches ... _60 
The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involve-
ment between church and state and far less than taxation of 
churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church 
and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the de-
sired separation insulating each from the other. 61 
817 
There is an important distinction between the Murdock/ Follett 
version of First Amendment entanglement doctrine articulated by Jus-
tice Douglas and the entanglement jurisprudence enunciated by 
ChidJustice Burger in Walz. In Murdock and Follett, the Court held tax 
exemption to be constitutionally required. This represents entangle-
ment concerns in their su·ongest possible formulation: exemption is 
constitutionally compelled to separate church and state. In contrast, 
the Walz Court held tax exemption to be constitutionally "permissible 
state accommodation" of religious institutions.62 
While entanglement concerns constitute the crux of Chief Justice 
Burger's Walz opinion, the opinion expounds two subthemes, both of 
which are important to the topic of this Article. First, Chief Justice 
Burger placed New York's exemption for religious institutions within 
the context of simultaneous exemption for the real property of secu-
lar deemosynary institutions, "a broad class of property owned by 
nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, librar-
ies, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic 
58 Id. at 673. 
59 Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. 
60 Id. at 675. 
61 Id. at 676. 
62 Id. at 673. 
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groups."63 New York thus does not exempt "churches as such."64 
Rather, New York "has an affirmative policy that considers these 
groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and 
finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. "65 
These observations do not fit comfortably with the entangle-
ment/ accommodation theory at the core of the Chief Justice's Walz 
opinion. There is, after all, no First Amendment restraint on goyern-
ment involvement with hospitals or playgrounds. 
It is, accordingly, tempting to dismiss these observations as di,;ta. I 
think, however, that it is more sensible to read these comments as an 
answer to Justice Douglas's Walz dissent.66 Justice Douglas indicted the 
New York tax exemption as a subsidy. If there is a subsidy, Chief Jus-
tice Burger replied for the majority, it is not a subsidy of religion "as 
such" but a subsidy of eleemosynary activity more generally. 
A second subtheme of the Chief Justice's Walz opinion is the leg-
islative discretion to determine tax classifications and rates. In Gibbons 
v. District of Columbia, the Supreme Court in 1886 construed a federal 
statute for the District of Columbia which limited tax exemption to 
church buildings and the land underlying such buildings.67 On the 
basis of this statute, the Gibbons Court denied exemption to church-
owned property which had been left vacant in anticipation of it be-
coming income-producing.68 In Walz, Chief Justice Burge1· quoted 
from the Gibbons decision: 
In the exercise of this (taxing) power, Congress, like any 
State legislature unrestricted by constitutional provisions, 
may at its discretion wholly exempt certain classes of prop-
erty from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than 
other property.69 
Chief Justice Burger cited this passage from Gibbons to demon-
strate that the Court at that time implicitly accepted the constitution-
ality of tax exemptions for religious institutions.70 This reading is fair 
as far as it goes. However, the passage from Gibbons implies more than 
63 Jd, 
64 Walz, 397 U.S. at 673. 
65 /d. 
66 See id. al 707. 
67 See 116 U.S. 404,406 ( 188li) . 
68 See id. al 428. 
69 Walz, 397 U.S. at 679-80 (quoting Gibbons, 116 U.S. at 408). The pa1·enthc tical was 
added to the language of Gibbons by the Chief Justice. 
70 See id. at 680. 
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this: Congress "may at its discretion" tax certain properties at lower 
rates and may wholly exempt from taxation other kinds of proper-
ties.i1 
Read in the context of the original Gibbons opinion, the state-
ment is consistent with the claim that legislatures possess great lati-
tude in defining tax bases. 72 That "discretion, " in turn, suggests the 
challenge inherent in identifying normative tax bases and the conse-
queut difficulty proclaiming any particular exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction as subsidizing rather than base-defining: there is no subsidy 
until there is a generally-accepted nonnative base from which such 
exclusion, exemption, or deduction is a deviation. Since, however, 
legislatures have great discretion when defining tax bases, it is often 
problematic to label a tax provision as a subsidy . 
.Justice Brennan's concurrence in Walz, while supporting the ma-
jority's result, does not embrace its entanglement/accommodationist 
reasoning73 but, rather, focuses upon the broad range of secular insti-
tutions and activities supported by the exemption. Indeed, there is a 
straight line from Justice Brennan's Walz concurrence, supporting tax 
exemption for churches as part of a broad exemption for sectarian 
and secular eleemosynary property, to Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly 
opinion, rejecting sales tax exemption limited to religious publica-
tions. 74 
While Justice Brennan opined that "[t]ax exemptions and gen-
eral subsidies ... are qualitatively different" from one another, his doc-
trinal support for the property tax exemption of religious property 
ultimately rests on subsidy grounds. 75 New York's exemption of 
church properties serves the secular purpose of encouraging 
churches' 
ii See id. 
i 2 See, e.g., Bittke1·. s11.jJra no te 25, at 244; Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realiznlion: Income 
Taxahon, Sectoral Accrelionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, I 9 C ARDOZO L. REv. 861 , 
889-93 ( I 997). 
73 Justice Brennan does mention ent anglement concerns. See Walz., 397 U.S. at 691-92 
("the terminatio n of exemptions would give rise " to ent anglement problems.). However, 
Justic,~ Brennan makes these comments almost in passing; they are no t central to his analy-
sis. Se.? id. 
;~ See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I , 5- 25 (1989). 
75 See H11lz, 397 U.S. at 690. Much of Justice Brennan 's concmTence is his101·ical in n a-
ture , designed to demonstrate that , as a mailer of past practice, property tax exemptions 
for ch,rches we1·e considei-ed accept able under the First Amendment. See id. at 681-88. As 
I sugi;est, infra, this historical data ultimate ly suggests that the founding gene.-ation con-
ce i\'e<I of tax exemption as a form of separatio n , 1101 subsidy. 
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public service activities and of a pluralistic society. During 
their ordinary operations, most churches engage in activities 
of a secular nature that benefit the community; and all 
churches by their existence contribute to the diversity of as-
sociation, viewpoint, and enterprise so highly valued by all of 
us.76 
It was, moreover, critical to Justice Brennan that this exemption 
covers both the properties of secular institutions and the properties in 
which churches conduct secular activities: 
[T]hese [religious] organizations are exempted because 
they, among a range of other private, nonprofit organiza-
tions contribute to the well-being of the community in a va-
riety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that 
would otherwise either have to be met by gene1'.al taxation, 
or be left undone, to the detriment of the community .... 77 
Government may properly include religious institutions 
among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive 
tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity 
of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigor-
ous, pluralistic society. 7s 
It is thus not surprising that, when Texas Monthly confronted the 
Court with a sales tax exemption limited to religious publications, Jus-
tice Brennan found that narrow exemption distinguishable from the 
broad exemption at issue in Walz.79 
Justice Harlan's Walz concurrence endorses Justice Brennan's 
emphasis on the breadth of the New York exemption.80 Moreover, Jus-
tice Harlan linked that breadth with entanglement concerns, conclud-
ing that there is less entanglement danger when an exemption is 
broad: 
76 Id. at 692-93. 
77 Id. at 687. Chief Justice Bm·ger, for the Wal.z majo1·ity, specifically rejected an} link-
age between churches' property tax exemptions and their seculai· good woi·ks. See id. at 
674. 
78 Id. at 689. 
79 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14. 
80 See 397 U.S. at 697 (Harlan, J., concuning) ("As long as the b1·eadth of exemption 
includes groups that pursue culturnl, morn), or spiritual imp1·ovement in multifarious secu-
lar ways, including, I would suppose, groups whose avowed tenets may be antitheological, 
atheistic, or agnostic, I can see no lack of neutrality in extending the benefit of the exemp-
tion to organized religious groups."). 
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In the instant case noninvolvement is further assured by the 
neutrality and breadth of the exemption. In the context of 
an exemption so sweeping as the one before us here its ad-
ministration need not entangle government in difficult 
classifications of what is or what is not religious, for any or-
ganization-although not religious in a customary sense-
would qualify under the pervasive rubric of a group 
dedicated to the moral and cultural improvement of men. 
Obviously the more discriminating and complicated the 
basis of classification for an exemption-even a neutral 
one-the greater the potential for state involvement in 
evaluating the character of the organizations.81 
821 
These observations highlight the ambiguity, in the tax context, of 
the concept of entanglement. Justice Harlan suggested that a property 
tax exemption limited to only religious organizations is more entan-
gling than no exemption at all since a limited exemption involves liti-
gation and controversy as to its boundaries. Thus, at its core, Justice 
Harlan's concept of entanglement is the avoidance of conflict as op-
posed to the accommodation of autonomy or, in Professor Brody's apt 
phrase, the sovereignty of religious institutions. From the latter per-
spective, an exemption applicable only to religious actors, like the ju-
dicially-created exemption of Murdock and Follett, can represent non-
entanglement at its most fundamental-the recognition that Free 
Exe1cise entails a zone of religious autonomy into which the govern-
ment may not inu·ude via taxation. 
In short, Justice Harlan's entanglement doctrine represents that 
doctrine in its weakest form , unconcerned in the Free Exercise con-
text with the institutional and communal autonomy of religious enti-
ties and individuals, but merely concerned with the avoidance of liti-
gation and conflict between church and state. Under this approach, 
tax statutes which tax religious organizations and practices are defen-
sible in First Amendment terms, as such statutes avoid borderline dis-
putes over narrowly drawn exemptions. 
In contrast, Justice Burger's opinion for the Walz majority exem-
plifies entanglement theory in a stronger form, sensitive to the sover-
eignty of religious organizations and actors, allowing the state to ex-
empt religious institutions from taxation to avoid governmental 
intrusion upon the resources and autonomy of religious institutions 
81 Id. al 698-99 (Harlan,J., concurring) . 
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and actors. Under this permissive/ accommodationist approach, the 
state has wide latitude to grant tax benefits to religious persons be-
cause such benefits are understood as recognizing sectarian auton-
omy, protected by the First Amendment. 
Finally, Murdock and Follett represent entanglement theory in its 
strongest form, compelling government to grant tax exemption to 
protect the sovereignty of religious organizations and actors. 
Justice Douglas, the author of Murdock and Follett, was the dis-
senter in Walz. For purposes of the present discussion, three aspects of 
Justice Douglas' Walz opinion are noteworthy. First, Justice Douglas 
based his dissent on the theory that "[a] tax exemption is a subsicly."82 
"I would suppose that in common understanding one of the best ways 
to 'establish' one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax 
exemption does. "83 
Second, Justice Douglas rejected the contention, accepted by Jus-
tices Harlan and Brennan, that the subsidization of religious entities is 
constitutionally permissible when matched by equivalent subsidization 
of secular nonprofits: 
Government could provide or finance operas, hospitals, his-
torical societies, and all the rest because they represent social 
welfare programs within the reach of the police power. In 
contrast, government may not provide or finance worship 
because of the Establishment Clause any more than it may 
single out "atheistic" or "agnostic" centers or groups and 
create or finance thern.84 
Finally, Justice Douglas, not surprisingly felt compelled to recon-
cile his Murdock and Follett opinions with his constitutional condemna-
tion of New York's property tax exemption. Murdock, Justice Douglas 
noted, distinguished between a constitutionally forbidden tax im-
posed directly on religious activity and a constitutionally acceptable 
levy imposed on the income of religious actors or on the "property 
used or employed in connection with those activities. "85 
However, this observation, accurate as far as it goes, does not fully 
address the tension between, on the one hand, the exemption-as-
subsidy argument embraced by Justice Douglas in Walz ("[a] tax ex-
82 Id. at 704 (Douglas,]. , dissenting). 
83 Id. at 701 (Douglas,]. , dissenting). 
84 Id. at 708-09 (Douglas,]., dissenting). 
85 397 U.S. at 707 (Douglas,]., dissenting) (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112). 
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emption is a subsidy"86) , and, on the other hand, the rejection of the 
subsidy label in Murdock and Follett (Murdock and Follett do not "mean 
that religious undertakings must be subsidized"87). 
The divisions manifest in Murdock, Follett, and Walz reappear in 
Texas Monthly. 88 Like Walz, Texas Monthly produced four separate opin-
ions. However, unlike Walz, in Texas Monthly, no single opinion gar-
nered the support of more than three justices. Quite aptly, Judge 
Noonan has labeled Texas Monthly an "enigma. "89 
Texas Monthly involved a Texas sales tax statute which applied to 
all s,~cular publications but not to religious literature. In a plurality 
opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, Justice Brennan 
found this narrowly focused sales tax exemption for religious publica-
tions distinguishable from the broad property tax exemption upheld 
in ·walz. Hence, the Texas sales tax statute violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
The central focus of Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly opinion is 
the same as of his Walz concurrence: the breadth of the tax exemp-
tion. According to Justice Brennan, in Walz, it was critical that the 
property tax exemption sustained by the Court excludes from taxa-
tion "real estate owned by a wide array of nonprofit organizations. "90 
The breadth of New York's property tax exemption was es-
sential to our holding that it was 'not aimed at establishing, 
sponsoring, or supporting religion,' but rather possessed the 
legitimate secular purpose and effect of contributing to the 
community's moral and intellectual diversity and encourag-
ing private groups to undertake projects that advanced the 
community's well-being and that would otherwise have to be 
funded by tax revenues or left undone.91 
As a summary of Justice Brennan's own Walz concurrence, as well 
as Justice Harlan's separate opinion, this characterization is accu-
rate. l2 It is, however, not a convincing portrayal of Chief Justice Bur-
ger's majority opinion for himself and five of his colleagues, an opin-
ion which concentrates upon "the autonomy and freedom of religious 
86 Id. at 704 (Douglas.J.. dissenting) . 
87 Follett. 321 U.S. at 577-78. 
88 Texas Mo nth~)', 489 U.S. at I. 
89 JOHN T. NOONAN ,JR., THE L USTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 195 (1998) . 
90 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5. 
91 Id. at 12 (internal citatio n o mitted) . 
92 See \,fo.lz, 397 U.S. at 690-704. 
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bodies" and which addresses the breadth of the New York exemption 
as a secondary theme.93 
Justice Brennan's emphasis upon the reach of the New York 
property tax exemption, and the contrasting narrowness of the Texas 
sales tax exemption, is understandable in light of his other critical 
move in Texas Monthly: "Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy. "94 
It is a short step from this premise to the conclusion that "Texas' nar-
row exemption"95 for sales of religious literature violates the Estab-
lishment Clause as a forbidden government subsidy of religion. 
Once again, difficulties appear if we probe beneath the "subsidy" 
label. Suppose a state with no corporate income tax but with a sales 
tax. Few, if any, would say that such a tax scheme subsidizes religious 
corporations by exempting their incomes from taxation. In this in-
stance, no corporate income is taxed. The generally-accepted charac-
terization of this hypothetical state's tax code would be that this state 
has, for better or worse, selected sales as a tax base and excluded cor-
porate income from taxation as a matter of base definition. 
It is consequently not true that "[e]very tax exemption consti-
tutes a subsidy. ''96 As Professor Bittker noted over a generation ago, it 
is only sensible to speak of exemptions as subsidies if there is an 
agreed upon tax base from which such exemptions deviate.97 
The inquiry thus becomes whether there is a generally-accepted 
normative tax base from which the Texas exemption for sales of relig-
ious literature deviates. The implicit premise of Justice Brennan's 
opinion is that the normative base is a tax on all sales; hence, to ex-
clude from taxation sales of religious literature is a subsidizing depar-
ture from the normative base. This, in turn, raises the question 
whether "all sales" is a constitutionally proper tax base from which to 
measure subsidizing deviations or whether, as a First Amendment 
matter, it is normatively appropriate for Texas to define its sales tax 
base to accommodate religious activity. 
In sum, that Texas' sales tax exemption for religious literature 
constitutes a "subsidy" is a conclusion, not an analysis. That conclu-
sion depends upon whether such an exemption entangles secular and 
sectarian authority unacceptably, or whether exemption is required 
( or permitted) to prevent such entanglement. If that exemption is 
93 Id. at 672. 
94 489 U.S. at 14. 
95 Id. at 15. 
96 Id. at 14. 
97 Ser Bittker, snpm no te 25, at 260-61. 
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constitutionally mandated or permitted, the exemption is not a "sub-
sidy'' but, rather, implements a constitutionally proper tax base. 
Consequently, it is critical which version of entanglement doc-
trine is applied to the Texas sales tax statute. The Murdock/Follett ren-
diticn of entanglement theory indicates that Texas' sales tax exemp-
tion for religious literature is constitutionally required. Justice 
Burger's accommodationist version of entanglement doctrine suggests 
that this exemption is constitutionally permissible. Justice Harlan's 
formulation of entanglement theory indicates that this narrow ex-
emption is constitutionally forbidden. Not surprisingly, Justice Bren-
nan, and his two colleagues who constituted the Texas Monthly plural-
ity, cpted for Justice Harlan's approach. 
To nudge aside Murdock, Follett, and their su·ong form of entan-
glement theory, Justice Brennan deployed a dual strategy: to "dis-
avow" parts of the Murdock and Follett opinions and to cabin what is 
subsequently left of those opinions into the particular factual circum-
stances of those cases.98 The plurality's outcome in Texas Monthly is, 
Justice Brennan acknowledged, "admittedly in tension with some un-
nen·ssarily sweeping statements in" Murdock and Follett.99 Indeed. As 
noted earlier, the Murdock Court declared: "The constitutional rights 
of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and 
printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or 
wholesalers of books. "100 
For the Texas Monthly plurality, precisely the opposite is u·ue: dif-
ferential sales tax treatment for religious and nonreligious publica-
tions constitutes an unacceptable subsidization of religion. Hence, to 
the extent Murdock and Follett suggest otherwise, Justice Brennan and 
his colleagues "disavow[ ed]" those opinions. 101 
Since Justice Brennan and his two colleagues did not overrule 
Murdock and Follett 102 (but just "disavow[ed]" those opinions' "unnec-
essarily sweeping statements"), they sought to distinguish Mwdock and 
FoUett from Texas Monthly by emphasizing three aspects of the munici-
pal license fees challenged in those earlier cases. First, the fees chal-
lenged in those cases were "occupation tax[ es]" unlike the sales tax at 
9e Set' Tl'xns Monthly, 489 U.S. at 21-22. 
9S Id. at 22. 
100 319 U.S. at 111. 
101 Texas Monthl:y, 489 U.S. at 21. 
1c2 Indeed, it is not clear what it would mean for three justices 10 overrule prior prece-
de nt. 
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issue in Texas Monthly. 103 Second, the Murdock/ Follett municipal fees 
were "flat"104 levies which imposed upon religious canvassers burdens 
"far from negligible. "105 Finally, the municipal taxes imposed in /\,fu-r-
dock and Follett "restrain[ed] in advance"106 by requiring payment be-
fore the Jehovah's Witnesses engaged in religious solicitation. 
Little of this is persuasive. Why is it constitutionally relevant that 
the lvlurdock/ Follett fees were structured as license fees on the occupa-
tion of soliciting while the Texas levy is denominated a sales tax? Jus-
tice Brennan never tells us why the formalistic distinction is relevant. 
The economic incidence of the two levies is the same. To the extent 
the taxes are passed onto purchasers, both increase the final price of 
religious materials; to the extent the taxes are absorbed by the sellers, 
both levies discourage the purveyors of religious materials. Thus, as a 
substantive matter, it makes no difference whether the tax is styled as 
an occupational fee or as a sales tax.107 
It, moreover, rewrites Murdock and Follett to characterize the bur-
dens imposed by the municipal ordinances as "far from negligible. "108 
The Murdock/ Follett dissenters consistently noted the absence of evi-
dence that the challenged municipal license fees were onerous; the 
majority never disagreed. It thus revises the story of Murdock and Fol-
lett to suggest that the Court invalidated the municipal fees as eco-
nomically burdensome. 
It is, finally, true that the license fees imposed in Murdock and 
Follett are payable prior to solicitation and sales while the Texas tax is 
collected after the sale occurs and the seller has cash with which to 
pay the tax. From a cash flow perspective, a tax collected earlier, prior 
to the event giving rise to taxpayer liquidity, is obviously tougher on 
the taxpayer than a tax collected later, when the taxpayer has the cash 
with which to pay.109 It is, however, difficult to see that the broad con-
103 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 24. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. al 23. 
106 Id. at 24 (quo1i11g Mwdork, 319 U.S. at 114) . 
107 In<leed, in Swaggart i\lli11istries v. Board of Equalization, Justice O'Connor distin-
guished Follett and M1mloclt 011 I.he other two grounds suggested by Justice Brenn an in 
Texas A1.onthly but did not p111"sue his distinction between occupation and sales tax1:s. See 
generally Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 ( 1990). 
108 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 23. 
109 Such liquidity concerns constitute a majo1· justification for the income tax rule of 
realization which generally postpones taxation until the taxpayer has cash. See Zelinsky, 
supm note 72, at 889-93. 
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stitutional assertions of Murdock and Follett come, in the final analysis, 
down to this. 
In short, Justice Brennan's app1~oach to Murdock and Follett is un-
persuasive. However, by rejecting the Murdock/ Follett version of entan-
glement doctrine in its strongest form, Justice Brennan set the 
groundwork for his embrace of the weaker version of entanglement 
theory exemplified by Justice Harlan's Walz concurrence. Under that 
theory, Texas' narrow exemption of religious publications from sales 
taxation "produce[s] greater state entanglement with religion than 
the denial of an exemption" since the state must determine the bor-
ders of that restricted exemption and such determination will enmesh 
the :,late in conflict with groups claiming the protection of the ex-
emption.110 
As the Texas Monthly dissenters noted,111 Chief Justice Burger's 
Walz opinion offers an alternative view of entanglement, one which 
justifies a narrow tax exemption as accommodating the autonomy of 
religious actors. In this sense, the Texas Monthly plurality assumes the 
answer to the critical question of the case, i.e., whether a narrow tax 
benefit restricted to religious entities causes more entanglement (be-
cause of the need to define the benefit's borders) or less entangle-
ment (because the state respects the autonomy of the religious sector 
by not taxing it). 
By assuming the former version of entanglement doctrine,Justice 
Brennan and his two colleagues answer in the affirmative the inquiry 
of this Article: tax exclusions, deductions, and exemptions for relig-
ious institutions are, as a constitutional matter, dependent upon the 
extension of the same exclusions, deductions, and exemptions to 
secular entities; narrow exemptions for religious bodies and undertak-
ings enmesh government and sectarian institutions in constitutionally 
unacceptable conflict over boundary definitions. 
Justice ·white concurred in striking down the Texas sales tax ex-
emption, relying solely on the Press Clause of the First Amendment. 112 
Hen:e, the critical fifth and sixth votes against the Texas exemption 
came from Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. 
Writing for them both, Justice Blackmun was uncomfortable with 
the plurality's approach to Follett and Murdock. Ultimately, however, 
Justke Blackmun 's concurrence comes to the same conclusion as Jus-
IM Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 20. 
111 See id. at 33-41. 
II! See id. at 25 (Blackmun,J. , concurring). 
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tice Brennan's plurality opinion: a narrow sales tax exemption re-
stricted to religious publications violates the Establishment Clause; a 
broader exemption, for a larger class subsuming religious literamre, 
passes constitutional muster. 
On the one hand, the plurality, according to Justice Blackrnun, 
unnecessarily "repudiat[es] Follett and Murdock,"113 both "longstanding 
precedents. "114 On the other hand, "a tax exemption limited to the sale 
of religious literature by religious organizations violates the Estab-
lishment Clause. "115 
For Justice Blackmun, Follett and Murdock might be reconciled 
with an Establishment Clause prohibition on state sales taxes "exempt-
ing religious literature alone. "116 While the task of such reconciliation 
"may be left for another day,"117 the implication is that states must ex-
empt religious literature from sales taxation but must also structure 
their sales tax exemptions broadly to include significant nonreligious 
publications as well. "[W]hether or not Follett and Murdock prohibit 
taxing the sale of religious literature, the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature. "118 
Thus, while the tone and reasoning of Justice Blackmun's con-
currence differs from that of the Texas Monthly plurality, the bottom 
line is the same: a sales tax exemption limited to religious publica-
tions violates the Establishment Clause; to pass constitutional muster, 
an exemption covering sales of religious literature must cover sales of 
secular literature as well. 
In Texas Monthly, Justice Scalia dissented for himself, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy and denounced the opinions of Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun "[a]s a judicial demolition project"119 
which invalidated, not just sales tax exemptions of the sort at issue in 
Texas Monthly, but a variety of tax benefits which apply only to relig-
ious actors and activities. Such tax benefits "permeate the state and 
federal codes," including the federal income tax exclusion for par-
sonages and parsonage allowances. 120 
m Id. at 27 (Blackmun,J., concurring). 
114 Id. (White,]., concurring). 
115 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun,J., concurring). 
116 Id. at 29 (Blackmun,J. , concurring). 
117 Id. at 28 (Blackmun,J. , concurring). 
118 Id. at 29 (Blackmun,J., conc111Ting). 
119 Id. at 29. While disagreeing with Justice White, Justice Scalia was somewhat more 
understated in desci-ibing that disagreement. See id. at 44-45 (Scalia,J., disseming) . 
120 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 33 (Scalia,J., dissenting) . 
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Citing Walz as an exemplar of the "accommodation principle,"121 
Justice Scalia correctly observed that Justice Brennan had conflated 
his and Justice Harlan's Walz concurrences with Chief Justice Burger's 
majority opinion.122 While that majority opinion had noted the 
breadth of the New York property tax exemption, that breadth was 
not critical to the majority's reasoning. 123 Rather, the central theme of 
Walz was the "accommodation principle":124 "The [Walz] Court did 
not .1pprove an exemption for charities that happened to benefit re-
ligion; it approved an exemption for religion as an exemption for re-
ligion. "125 
Moreover, the Texas sales tax exemption, like the New York 
property tax exemption, reduces entanglement: 
[H]ere as in Walz, it is all but certain that elimination of the 
exemption will have the effect of increasing government's in-
volvement with religion. The Court's invalidation of [the 
sales tax exemption] ensures that Texas churches selling 
publications that promulgate their religion will now be sub-
ject to numerous statutory and regulatory impositions, in-
cluding audits, requirements for the filing of security, report-
ing requirements, writs of attachment without bond, tax 
liens, and the seizure and sale of property to satisfy tax de-
linquencies.126 
There is an important distinction in Justice Scalia's use of the 
terms "accommodation" and "entanglement." He used the latter term 
in a sense similar to Justice Harlan's, i.e., the avoidance of litigation 
and enforcement-based conflict, and reserved the term "accommoda-
tion' to describe more fundamental governmental respect for the 
autonomy and sovereignty of religious bodies. In the end, such ac-
commodation/ entanglement concerns led Justice Scalia and his col-
leag11es to conclude that tax benefits for religious institutions and ac-
tors properly recognize the autonomy of religious institutions and do 
not depend upon the simultaneous extension of such benefits to secu-
lar entities and undertakings. Hence, such tax benefits are constitu-
121 Id. at 39 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 33 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 36-37 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
121 /d. at 38-41 (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
m Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 38 (Scalia,]. , dissenting) . 
126 /d. at 44 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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tional when extended to religious groups alone along such lines as 
the Texas sales tax exemption. 
The Texas Monthly dissenters also found greater force in Follett 
and Murdock than did Justice Brennan. While Follett and Murdock "are 
narrowly distinguishable," wrote Justice Scalia, since the Texas sales 
tax "exemption comes so close to being a constitutionally required 
accommodation, there is no doubt that it is at least a permissible 
one."127 
In short, for the Texas Monthly dissenters, Follett, Murdock, and the 
"accommodation principle" articulated by Chief Justice Burger in 
Walz indicate that the Texas sales tax exemption for religious litera-
ture is, as a First Amendment matter, "not only permissible but per-
haps required. "128 
Judge Noonan has characterized Texas Monthly as marking the 
end of the Supreme Court's "Murdock mind. "129 Perhaps so. But in 
Texas Monthly, two concurring justices struggled with the scope of the 
Murdock/ Follett principle while the three dissenters professed their 
adherence to those earlier decisions. 130 
It is therefore all the more striking that the Court's subseq,.1ent 
decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization resulted in 
a single unanimous opinion which effectively eviscerated Murdock and 
Follett, and which, for all practical purposes, embraced Justice Bren-
nan's opinions in Walz and Texas Monthly as the Court's controlling 
doctrine. 131 
California's sales tax statute contains no exemption for religious 
items. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries sold religious merchandise in Cali-
fornia and claimed a constitutional right to sales tax exemption per 
Murdock and Follett.1 32 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous 
Court, rejected this claim to constitutional exemption from Califor-
nia's sales tax. 
Justice O'Connor, echoing Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly opin-
ion,133 found the key distinctions between the California sales tax and 
127 Id. at 41---42 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
128 Id. at 41 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
129 NooNAN, supra note 89, at 193. 
130 See supra notes 111-128 and accompanying text. 
131 Swaggart Minis/lies, 493 U.S. at 378. 
132 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries also sold admittedly nonreligious items in Californi:l, but 
did not claim sales tax exeinption for these. 
133 While Justice O'Connor, like Justice Brennan, focused upon the flat and prepaid 
natme of the Murdock/ Fol!Rtt license fees, Justice O'Connor did not pursue Justice Bren-
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the municipal license fees at issue in Murdock and Follett to be the flat 
and prepaid nature of those municipal fees. 134 In Murdock and Follett, 
Justice O'Connor wrote, the "primary vice of the ordinances at issue 
was that they operated as prior restraints of constitutionally protected 
conduct," i.e. , the rights of the Jehovah's Witnesses to engage in relig-
ious solicitation.135 Such fees "act[ed] as a precondition to the free ex-
ercise of religious beliefs" unlike the California sales tax, collected 
after a sale had occurred.136 Moreover, the California sales tax is cali-
brated to the quantum of the taxpayer's sales; indeed, the tax "repre-
sen~. only a small fraction of any retail sale. "137 
In short, in Follett and Murdock, it was "the particular nature of 
the challenged taxes" which violated the Free Exercise Clause as these 
were "flat license taxes that operated as a prior restraint on the exer-
cise of religious liberty. "138 
Justice O 'Connor also concluded that the California sales tax, 
applied to Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, did not result in excessive en-
tanglement of religion and government. In this context, Justice 
O 'Connor used the term "administrative entanglement,"139 signaling 
a limited definition of entanglement concerns: 
Most significantly, the imposition of the sales and use tax 
without an exemption for appellant does not require the 
State to inquire into the religious content of the items sold 
or the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the 
items, because the materials are subject to the tax regardless 
of content or motive. From the State's point of view, the 
critical question is not whether the materials are religious, 
but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which only 
involves a secular determination.140 
This is Justice Harlan's conception of entanglement theory, the 
avoidance of conflict and litigation over borderlines. From this van-
tage, no sales tax exemption is less entangling than an exemption lim-
nan 's Lhird disLinction belween occupational taxes and sales Laxes. See SwagtJarl M inis/lies, 
493 U.S. at 387-89. 
13I Id. 
13 ; Id. at 387. 
l ,Vi Id. 
131 SwagtJarl Minisflies, 493 U.S. at 389. 
u.i Id. at 386. 
13
'
1 Id. at 393. 
14
'
1 Id. at 396. 
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ited to sales of religious items, given the borderline problems arising 
from such a limited exemption. 
Indeed, once Justice O'Connor rejected the Follett/ Murdock vision 
of constitutionally-required exemption to avoid intrusion into relig-
ious activity, the Harlan form of entanglement theory was the only 
approach available to her. By definition, the permissive, accommoda-
tionist version of entanglement doctrine articulated by Chief Justice 
Burger in Walz is inapplicable in a case like Swaggart Ministries, as Cali-
fornia chose against accommodation by adopting a sales tax statute 
with no religious exemptions. 
Particularly significant for the topic of this Article is Justice 
O'Connor's observation, in the context of her entanglement analysis, 
that Walz approved property tax exemption only "as part of a general 
exemption for nonprofit institutions. "141 This observation effectively 
elevates the concurrences of Justices Brennan and Harlan into the 
Court's official understanding of Walz: tax exemptions, exclusions and 
deductions can only be granted to churches if such benefits are simul-
taneously extended to a broad class of properties.142 Moreover, while 
Justice O'Connor never formally uses the term "subsidy" in Swaggart 
Ministries, it is difficult to read that opinion as other than an embrace 
of Justice Brennan's perspective for the Texas Monthly plurality. 
Indeed, the conflict between Swaggart Ministries (which finds 1ittle 
life in Follett and Murdock) and the analysis of the Texas Monthl) dis-
senters (which sees greater vitality in those older decisions) leavei: the 
reader wondering why those dissenters joined Justice O 'Connor's 
opinion. At one level, the Texas Monthly dissent and Swaggart Minishies 
can be reconciled via the permissive nature of the accommodation 
principle: that Texas may constitutionally exempt religious literature 
from sales taxation does not mean that California must exempt in this 
fashion. At another level, however, the· Texas Monthly dissent is more 
difficult to harmonize with Justice O 'Connor's opinion in Swaggart 
Ministries, given their different perceptions of the scope of Follett and 
Murdock. If, as Justice Scalia wrote, Texas Monthly was a 'Judicial demo-
lition project,"143 Swaggart Minist·ries carted away the rubble-with no 
complaint from the Texas Monthly dissenters. 
In contrast to the unanimously-decided Swaggart Ministries, the 
Court's earlier decision in Mueller v. Allen reflected another 5-4 split 
141 Id. at 393. 
142 See Swaggart Mi11ist1ies, 493 U.S. at 393. 
143 See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 29 (Sralia,J. , clisse111ing) . 
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among the justices.144 In Muelle1; the Court sustained against First 
Amendment challenge a Minnesota income tax deduction for par-
ents' expenses for their children's elementary and secondary educa-
tiom.. A critical factor for the five justice majority was the facial 
breadth of the deduction, available not just to parents sending their 
children to sectarian schools but also to parents educating their off-
spring in public schools and in secular private institutions. For exam-
ple, the Minnesota deduction is availab}e if a parent living in one pub-
lic s<·hool district pays tuition to send her child to a public school in 
another district.145 The deduction is also available if a public school 
parent pays for "[c]ertain summer school tuition."146 The deduction is 
specifically disallowed for the purchase of religious materials. 147 
The majority's principal doctrinal problem in Mueller was to dis-
tinguish the Minnesota income tax deduction sustained in that case 
from the New York tax provision previously su·uck in Committee for Pub--
lie Education v. Nyquist. 148 Among the relevant distinctions, according 
to the Mueller Court, was the limited availability of the Nyquist tax 
benefits, obtainable only by "parents of children in nonpublic 
schools. "149 In contrast, the Minnesota "deduction is available for edu-
cational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose chil-
dren attend public schools and those whose children attend nonsec-
tarian private schools or sectarian private schools. "150 
Since Minnesota grants the deduction for educational outlays 
"neutrally" to a broad specu·um of citizens, that deduction "is not 
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. "151 
ln response to the assertion that, in practice, "the bulk of deduc-
tions" are taken by Minnesota parents sending their children to relig-
ious schools, the majority replied that the relevant consideration is 
the facial neutrality of the challenged statute.152 In response to the 
assertion that the Minnesota deduction requires excessive entangle-
ment as "state officials must determine whether particular textbooks 
qualify for a deduction" by virtue of their secular content, the major-
ity, without extensive analysis, concluded that that determination is no 
14-I Muellerv. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) . 
14
,, Id. al 391 n. 2, item 2. 
141; Id. at 391 n . 2, item 3. 
147 Id. at 390 n. 1 (reproducing MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (22) (2000)) . 
1411 413 U.S. 756 (1973) . 
14,1 463 U.S. at 398. 
1511 Id. at 397. 
15: Id. at 398-99. 
151
' Id. at 40 I. 
834 Boston College Law R,miew [Vol. 42:805 
more entangling than other similar judgments the Court had previ-
ously approved as consistent with the First Amendment.153 Finally, in 
language reminiscent of Chief Justice Burger's Walz opinion,154 the 
Mueller Court noted the "broad latitude" of the Minnesota legislature 
in designing the state's income tax base.155 
In sum, for the Mueller Court, the facial breadth of the Minnesota 
tax deduction, available to public school parents and to parents send-
ing their children to secular private schools, immunized the deduc-
tion from Establishment Clause challenge. 
The Mueller minority accepted none of this. For the minority, the 
Minnesota tax deduction is indistinguishable from the New York tax 
provision struck in Nyquist. Each constitutes a "subsidy" of sectarian 
education in violation of the Establishment Clause.156 Moreover, in 
practice, this tax subsidy is focused upon parents who utilize religious 
schools because such parents constitute "the vast majority of the tax-
payers who are eligible to receive the benefit" of the deduction. 157 
Even if, in practice, the deduction conferred benefits more broadly, 
according to the Mueller minority, the deduction would fail constitu-
tional muster as furthering "the religious mission" of sectarian 
schools. 158 
In short, for the Mueller dissenters, the breadth of the Minnesota 
deduction is illusory and irrelevant. The Minnesota deduction is a 
subsidy that, as a practical matter, subsidizes religious schools. Ewn if 
the deduction in practice subsidized more broadly, it would violate 
the Establishment Clause as supporting religious instruction. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In light of all of this, are tax benefits for religious institu1ions 
constitutionally dependent on benefits for secular entities? 
As a matter of positive law, the answer is today a qualified "yes." 
The Court's current doctrine, as articulated in Texas Monthly and 
Swaggart Ministries, is that exemptions, exclusions, and deductions 
153 Id. at 403. 
154 See Walz, 489 U.S. at 680. 
155 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash. , 
461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)). 
156 Id. at 408-09 (Marshall, J. , dissenting) ("The statute is little more than a subsidy of 
tuition masquerading as a subsidy of genernl educational expe nses."). 
1;1 Id. al 405 (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
158 Id. al 409 n.2 (M;u-shall,J., dissenting). 
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limited to religious actors and activities constitute unconstitutional 
subsidies in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
The strongest statements to the contrary remain Murdock and 
Follett, which indicate that exemption is constitutionally compelled for 
sect2.rian entities and undertakings when taxation intrudes too deeply 
upon the autonomy of religion. However, Texas Monthly and Swaggart 
Ministries indicate that there is little vitality left to Follett and Murdock. 
After Texas Monthly and Swaggart Ministries, it is hard to envision cases 
beyond the specific facts of Follett and Murdock in which tax benefits 
limited to religious organizations or activities are constitutionally 
compelled or permitted. 
The qualification to this conclusion is that, strictly speaking, Texas 
Mon~hly and Swaggart Ministries did not inter Follett and Murdock. In-
deed, in Swaggart Minist·ties, Justice O'Connor, writing for all nine 
members of the Court, was careful to observe that "it is of course pos-
sible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate, even if generally appli-
cable, might effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices."159 
In practice, however, it is difficult to conceive of a sufficiently "oner-
ous tax rate" which, if generally applied, would today cause the Court 
to invoke Follett and Murdock to exempt religious entities or actors. 
The other support for tax benefits limited to religious institutions 
is the majority opinion in Walz, premised on a concern for the sover-
eignty of such institutions. The solicitude for "the autonomy and 
freedom of religious bodies"160 which animated Chief Justice Burger's 
Walz opinion supports, in the name of accommodation, exemption 
from taxation for religious actors and activities, even if other non-
profit institutions and undertakings (without the same First Amend-
ment status) are not so exempted. 
However, today it is not Walz, but the Walz concurrences of Jus-
tices Brennan and Harlan which guide the Court. Those concur-
renc ::s approve of tax benefits for religious institutions only in the 
cont,~xt of benefits applying broadly to secular eleemosynary entities 
and indicate that exemptions restricted to religious groups create un-
acceptable entanglement between church and state as they fight over 
the boundaries of such exemptions. 
Finally, the Mueller Court grounded its approval of state tax de-
ductions for parochial school expenses upon the availability of such 
1s•1 493 U.S. 378, 392 ( 1990) . 
1611 397 U.S. 664,672 (1970) . 
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deductions for parents sending their children to public schools and to 
secular private schools. 
The proverbial bottom line is that, given the Court's current case 
law, tax benefits extended to religious institutions are constitutional 
only as part of benefits granted more broadly to secular persons. In 
light of the Court's present predilection to characterize tax exemp-
tions, exclusions, and deductions as subsidies, it is not surprising that 
the Court would, as a First Amendment matter, require such subsidies 
to be granted broadly and not just concentrated on religious entities 
and activities. 
These conclusions do not end all inquiry. Most obviously, there is 
the question: How broad must a tax benefit be to be broad enough 
for First Amendment purposes? If, for example, a state granted prop-
erty tax exemptions to churches and hospitals, but not to schools, mu-
seums, or other charitable institutions, would that exemption be 
broad enough to pass constitutional muster? 
I leave detailed consideration of this question , and others, for 
another day. For purposes of this Article, I would simply paraphrase 
Lincoln and answer the inquiry-How broad must tax benefits be?-
by responding: Broad enough to satisfy the Court. 161 
Although, as a matter of positive law, tax exemptions, exclusions, 
and deductions for religious institutions are today constitutional only 
if such benefits are simultaneously extended to secular entities, as a 
normative matter, I come to the opposite conclusion: the constitu-
tionality of tax benefits for sectarian actors and undertakings should 
not depend upon benefits being granted concurrently to secular insti-
tutions. 
The path to this conclusion starts with the recognition that: the 
Court has often used the "subsidy" label in a conclusory fashion and 
ends with the judgment that Chief Justice Burger's accommodationist 
version of entanglement theory is, in the tax context, the most com-
pelling of the available approaches. 
As noted earlier, in discussion of tax exemptions, exclusions, and 
deductions, the term "subsidy" is typically invoked in a reflexive fash-
ion which ignores the reality that much tax exemption is best under-
stood as base defining. 162 If, to modify an earlier example,163 a mu-
nicipality is financed exclusively by property taxes, it is not compelling 
161 When asked "How long must a man 's legs be?" P1·eside11t Lincoln is said to have an-
swered, "Long enough to reach the ground." 
162 See m/Jra not es 13-24 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
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to characterize the municipality's failure to tax income and sales as a 
"subsidy" of income and sales. Rather, that the locality's taxing power 
excludes income and sales is a matter of tax base selection. Similarly, 
in Murdock and Follett, it is, as Justice Murphy noted, 164 unconvincing 
to characterize the Court as creating subsidies since, under the 
Court's holdings, the municipalities could not, consistent with the 
Free Exercise clause, impose their license taxes on religious canvass-
ers. [f the constitutionally-mandated tax base excludes such taxes to 
begin with, it is not a "subsidy" to refrain from taxation but, rather, 
the implementation of the constitutionally-required tax base. 
In sum, no one has ever refuted Professor Bittker's observation of 
a generation ago165 that the "subsidy" moniker is convincingly applied 
to an exemption, deduction, or exclusion only after there is agree-
ment about a166 normative tax base from which such exemption, de-
duction, or exclusion deviates. 167 
Hence the analytical weakness of the Court's deployment of the 
"subsidy" designation: an exemption is a subsidy only if it deviates 
from a normative tax base. However, entanglement/accommodation 
concerns tracing back at least to Walz suggest that exemptions for re-
ligious entities are normatively appropriate recognitions of the 
autonomy of such entities. The reflexive invocation of the "subsidy" 
label, explicitly or implicitly, thus assumes away the key issue, i.e., 
whether tax exemption is a constitutionally proper acknowledgment 
of the sovereignty of sectarian institutions. If so, the resulting tax 
benefits are not subsidies because they implement, rather than devi-
ate from, a normative tax base. 
Consider again, in this context, Texas Monthly. If one grants the 
plurality's premise that Texas' sales tax exemption is a subsidy, the 
plurality's conclusion is compelling: because the subsidy extends only 
to rdigious publications, that subsidy runs afoul of the Establishment 
Clause as a subvention of religion. However, the "subsidy" label is only 
1E4 See Follett v. Town ofMcConnick, 321 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1944) (Murphy,]., concur-
ring). 
rn5 SPe Bittker, supra note 25, at 260-61. 
166 Implicit in the use of the anicle "a" is an important contention: Since tax base 
definition typically involves selection from a range of plausible alternatives, there is 1)1)i-
cally no single nonnati\'e tax but, rathei-, a spectrum of normatively plausible tax bases. 
Hence, it makes sense to speak of "a" normali\'e tax. ra1he1· than "the" nonnative tax. Of 
cours,~, tax expenditure stalwans reject this approach. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified 
Plans and ldl'ntijj,ing Tax Ex/1e11dit11rps: A RPjoinder to Profmor Stl'i11, 9 AM. J. TAX PoL'v 257, 
259-62 (1991). 
1c7 See Bittker, s11/1m note 25, at 260-61. 
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convincing after one rejects the proffered justification for the sales tax 
exemption-that it is a constitutionally permitted accommodation of 
the autonomy of religious institutions and activity. If that justification 
is correct, there is no "subsidy" in exempting sales of religious litera-
ture since, in respecting religious sovereignty, the Texas sales tax stat-
ute defines a constitutionally appropriate tax base.168 
Moreover, the emphasis of the Muell.er majority on the breadth of 
the Minnesota tax deduction is only understandable if the majority 
implicitly accepted the "subsidy" label pinned by the minority on the 
deduction. If the deduction is a subsidy, it is sensible to defend that 
subsidy, as the majority did, by its facial breadth, breadth which sug-
gests that the deduction subsidizes education, not religious education. 
If, in contrast, the deduction is not a subsidy, but, rather, a recogni-
tion of religious autonomy, the relevant issue is whether, under the 
First Amendment, such recognition of religious autonomy is constitu-
tionally permissible. 
There is, thus, an intimate relationship among the concepts of 
subsidy, tax base definition, and entanglement/ accommodation: the 
"subsidy" label is convincing only after we define a normative tax base 
from which the alleged subsidy deviates. However, a tax base can con-
stitutionally serve as a normative baseline only if it passes First 
Amendment muster in entanglement/ accommodation terms. 
In short, the underlying issue in these cases is not the 
classification vel non of a particular tax provision as a subsidy. Once we 
pierce through the "subsidy" label, the fundamental choice in these 
cases is the version of entanglement theory to be applied under the 
First Amendment. 
Justice Harlan's theory indicates that exemptions, deductions, 
and exclusions limited to religious institutions and actors are exces-
168 From this vantage, Swaggart Minis/lies was correctly decided even if Texas Monthly 
was not. Once constitutionally-compelled exemption a la Fol/ell and Murdock is foreclosed , 
the two 1·emaining approaches 10 entanglement concen1s ,u-e the con11·asting vantages of 
Justice Harlan (exemptio n limited to 1·eligious entities creates unacceptable ent;mgle-
ment) and Chief Justice Bm·ger (exemption of 1·eligious institutions is a constitutionally 
permissive accommodation of religion) . 
From bo th perspectives, the re is no infirmity to California's sales tax s1a1u1e 
since, pe1· the Burger fonnulation, accommodation is permiued lmt 11 01 requi1·ed •vhilt'. 
per the Harlan approach , Califon1ia's statute properly avoids entanglement by taxing 1·e-
ligious publications, thereby foregoing border-defining conflict over the contour! of a 
n arrow exemption for religious literature . ' 
Indeed , from this vantage, the re is logic to the participation (if no t the silence) 
of the Texas Monthly dissenters in Swaggart iVlinist,ies: Texas can recognize the autonomy of 
re ligions ac tors but California is not required 10. 
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sively entangling because of the borderline conflict such narrowly-
focused tax benefits engender. Chief Justice Burger's accommodation-
ist vantage, on the other hand, suggests that taxing religious entities is 
entangling because of enforcement problems and that, in any event, 
resp':'!ct for sectarian autonomy permits states to refrain from taxing. 
Insofar as these contrasting perspectives represent empirical dis-
agreement, there is evidence on both sides and no yardstick of which 
I know with which to measure whether borderline or enforcement 
controversies entail greater entanglement.169 
The issue, at its core, turns, not on the much used "subsidy" la-
bel, but on one's conception of the mandate of the First Amendment. 
If the First Amendment permits governments to refrain from taxation 
in recognition of the sovereignty of religious actors and activities, Jus-
tice Burger wins the debate and tax benefits extended solely to relig-
ious institutions pass constitutional muster as acknowledgments of 
that sovereignty. If, in contrast, tax exemption limited to religious in-
stitutions constitutes impermissible governmental involvement in sec-
tarian affairs, Justice Harlan wins the debate because such exemption 
involves borderline conflict of the sort against which Justice Harlan 
warned in Walz. 
Reasonable and public-spirited persons disagree as to these mat-
ters. Let me suggest, however, that, in the context of tax exemptions, 
ther~ are two tax-specific reasons for privileging the "accommodation 
prindple"170 over its competitor, the Harlan avoidance-of-conflict ap-
proach-reasons I think should be persuasive even for those generally 
unsympathetic to the accommodationist perspective. 
The first of these reasons is historical: the accommodationist ac-
count explains the thoughts and actions of the founding generation. 
Much ink has been spilled addressing the apparent paradox that the 
founding generation proclaimed the separation of church and state 
whil,:'! simultaneously confirming and extending tax exemption for 
chmches.171 From a subsidy perspective, there is indeed a paradox to 
16 l In recent times, the best known boundary dispute has been the protrncted conflict 
between the IRS and the Church of Scientology over the federal income tax charitable 
ded11<tion . See Paul Streckfus, Scientolngy Case Redux, 87 TAX NOTES 1414 (June 5, 2000). As 
to enlo t-cement controve1·sies, the most recent such controversy 1·eceiving national atten-
tion l: as been the IRS's seizm·e of the Indianapolis Baptist Temple to enforce tax liens. See 
Go1J/'nu11ent Seizes Indiana/Jo/is Chunh in Tax Dispute, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 14, 2001, 
at 36-108. 
in Texas MonthlJ, 489 U.S. at 39 (Scalia,]. , dissenting). 
m See, e.g., Walz, 397 U .S. at 661-68 (Brennan,]., concuning), 704-07 (Douglas,]., 
concuJTing), 716--27 (appendix to Justice Douglas' dissent). 
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proclaiming that religion should be disestablished while concurrently 
confirming the subsidization of religion via tax benefits. 
However, the contradiction disappears if the founding genera-
tion did not think of tax exemption as subsidy, but as neutrality. We 
should apply our intellectual categories to the past with great care. As 
Professor Diamond observes, the irregular nature of taxation in colo-
nial times suggests that exemptions carried different meaning then 
than now.172 Moreover, the colonists continued many pre-existing ex-
emptions with little discussion, almost as a matter of inertia. 
On balance, the most sensible resolution of the asserted paradox 
of the founding generation simultaneously propounding separation-
ism and exemption is that that generation thought of exemption as a 
form of separationism, in our vocabulary, a recognition of secta.rian 
autonomy. The founders thus, by their actions, implicitly sided with 
the Chief Justice in the Burger-Harlan debate: tax exemption properly 
recognizes sectarian autonomy and is accordingly compatible with the 
separation of church and state. 
The second reason, in the tax context, for p1·eferring the ac-
commodationist version of entanglement theory is the illusory nature 
of Justice Harlan's promise that conflict will be avoided by ta"ing 
churches. Whether the state taxes or exempts religious groups, there 
will be conflict between secular and sectarian authority. If chur.::hes 
are tax exempt, the conflict will, as Justice Harlan observed, be over 
the boundaries of exemption; if churches are taxed, the conflict, as 
Chief Justice Burger suggested,173 will be over enforcement. Indeed, 
the problems of valuing religious assets for property taxation seem 
particularly severe .174 
If Justice Harlan 's account of taxation as conflict avoiding were 
persuasive, it might convince us to disregard the lessons to be drawn 
from history and conclude that taxing religious institutions entangles 
government and church less than exempting such institutions. But 
that account is ultimately unpersuasive since taxing sectarian actors 
and activity is as litigation-engendering as granting them exemption. 
172 See Diamond, supra note 15. 
173 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674; id. at 698-99 (Harlan,J., concuITing). 
174 The valuation of real estate is often difficult under real property and transfer tax 
systems. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionis111, and the 
Virtue of Allairiable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 861, 881-83 (1997). For much singll' pur-
pose religious property, valuation problems are even greater, given the infrequenC) with 
which such property is sold and such property's non-income producing nature . 
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The upshot, I suggest, is that the accommodationist perspective is 
the most convincing of the alternatives in the tax context. If, in ac-
cordance with that perspective, the First Amendment permits gov-
ernments to refrain from taxation as a recognition of the autonomy of 
religious institutions and undertakings, tax benefits extended solely to 
religious institutions should pass constitutional muster as acknowl-
edgments of that autonomy and should not be dismissed in conclu-
sory fashion as subsidies of the sectarian.175 
CONCLUSION 
Today, the Supreme Court's case law generally conditions tax ex-
emptions, deductions, and exclusions for religious institutions upon 
the concurrent extension of such benefits to secular entities and ac-
tivities. The Court's position flows logically from its acceptance of the 
premise that tax exemptions, deductions, and exclusions constitute 
subsidies. 
However, as a normative matter, my conclusion is to the contrary. 
In the context of tax benefits, the "subsidy" label is usually deployed 
in a conclusory and unconvincing fashion. The First Amendment is 
best understood as permitting governments to refrain from taxation 
to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and activities; 
hence, tax benefits extended solely to sectarian institutions should 
pass constitutional muster as recognition of that autonomy. Since it is 
most compelling to conceive of religious tax exemption as the ac-
knowledgment of sectarian sovereignty, rather than the subsidization 
of religion, there is no convincing constitutional reason to link that 
exernption to the simultaneous extension of comparable tax benefits 
to secular entities and undertakings. 
In the final analysis, tax exemption does not subsidize churches, 
but leaves them alone. 
m As noted previously, tax benefits limited to religious institutions may raise policy 
considerations which suggest that such benefits should be offe1·ed mo1·e brnadly. My con-
clusion is that tax deductions, exclusions, and exemptions restricted to religious institu-
tions .u-e constitutional, not that they are necessarily wise . 
